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WE ARE GUILTY OF FALLING VICTIM TO A HIERARCHY
REPORTING SYSTEM: THE PROSECUTION OF SIDELINE
PLAYERS IN THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
FOOTBALL SEXUAL ASSAULT SCANDAL
I. THE PRE-GAME SHOW: INTRODUCTION
On any given Saturday when the Pennsylvania State University
(“Penn State”) football team hosts a visiting opponent, hundreds of
thousands of students, alumni, legacy families, and visitors in town
experience the electricity of attending a football game at Beaver
Stadium gather in parking lots hours before kickoff.1  University
tour guides brag to visitors and potential future Nittany Lions that
the volume of the cheers from the stadium are so loud, the roar
registers on the Richter scale.2  Throughout the game, the crowd
chants the school’s beloved mantra, one that has been used since
1946: “We Are, Penn State.”3  However, in 2011, the all-encompass-
ing admiration for the football program experienced an adversity
much more devastating than a loss to their rival team: allegations of
repeated child sexual abuse by one of the team’s former coaches,
and a subsequent cover-up of this abuse by other highly-regarded
leaders of the University and football community, came to the
surface.4
1. See Edward Moran, In Happy Valley, Penn State Football Means Big Business,
CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 9, 1997), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1997-11-
09-9711090337-story.html [https://perma.cc/2LFC-ZPRS] (detailing exciting envi-
ronment that begins days before each Penn State home football game);  see also
Zach Spedden, Fundraising  Key  to  Future  Beaver  Stadium  Plans, FOOTBALL   STA-
DIUM DIGEST (May 9, 2018), https://footballstadiumdigest.com/2018/05/fun-
draising-key-to-future-beaver-stadium-plans/ [https://perma.cc/2RA4-FCHB]
(noting Beaver Stadium’s current capacity of 106,572).
2. See Maddie Brightman, Top Five Whiteouts in Penn State History, COMMRADIO
SPORTS. TRIB. (Oct. 11, 2013), https://commmedia.psu.edu/sports/story/top-five-
whiteouts-in-penn-state-history [https://perma.cc/2M6Z-N5W7] (describing Penn
State football’s first ever white out game, which took place in 2005 against Ohio
State);  Interview with Bernadette Berger, Former Tour Guide, Pennsylvania State
University Class of 2015, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Feb. 13, 2019).
3. See Richard T. Hughes, “We are Penn State”: A Story to Help Us See in the Dark,
PENN LIVE (Jan. 2, 2012), https://www.pennlive.com/editorials/index.ssf/2012/
01/we_are_penn_state_a_story_to_h.html [https://perma.cc/ALJ3-G5X2] (dis-
cussing ethical and political origin of Penn State’s chant).
4. See Adam  Clark, Students  Question  PSU  Leadership, MORNING  CALL (Nov.
8, 2011), https://www.mcall.com/news/local/mc-penn-state-sandusky-student-re-
action-20111107-story.html [https://perma.cc/AUN7-J8ZE] (discussing Penn
State students’ responses of disappointment after learning of Sandusky’s abuse and
failure of school leaders to “take child abuse seriously”); see also FREEH SPORKIN &
(101)
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From 1977 to 1999, Gerald “Jerry” Sandusky served as defen-
sive coordinator for Penn State’s football team, and he remained
active in the Penn State football community well after his retire-
ment.5  While employed with Penn State, Sandusky founded The
Second Mile, a non-profit organization aimed at providing opportu-
nities for young men with disadvantaged backgrounds.6  Ten males’
allegations of child abuse, each of whom formerly attended The
Second Mile, formed the basis for Sandusky’s arrest and subsequent
conviction.7  In June 2012, Sandusky was sentenced to a maximum
of sixty years in prison for forty-five counts of child abuse.8
Although Sandusky alone was charged with committing acts of
sexual assault, the Court of Common Pleas in Dauphin County and
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that he was not the only
person at fault for what happened to his victims.9  Graham Spanier,
Tim Curley, and Gary Schultz, all of whom were high-ranking ad-
ministrative officials at Penn State at the time Sandusky was com-
mitting abuse, were arrested and charged with “endangering the
SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL REGARDING THE AC-
TIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE  UNIVERSITY  RELATED TO THE  CHILD  SEXUAL
ABUSE  COMMITTED BY  GERALD A.  SANDUSKY,  8,  13  (2012), available  at  https://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/396512-report-final-071212.html [https://
perma.cc/G4ZE-JA4M] [hereinafter the “Freeh Report”] (“On November 4, 2011
the Attorney General . . . filed criminal charges against Gerald A. Sandusky . . .
includ[ing] multiple counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated
indecent assault, corruption of minors, unlawful contact with minors and endan-
gering the welfare of minors.”).
5. See CNN Library, Penn State Scandal Fast Facts, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/
2013/10/28/us/penn-state-scandal-fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/
DRT7-L6PQ] (updated Nov. 27, 2019, 5:22 PM) (“June 1999 – Sandusky retires
from Penn State after coaching there for 32 years, but receives emeritus status,
with full access to the campus and football facilities.”).
6. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 192 A.3d 141, 142 (Pa. Super. 2018) (observ-
ing Sandusky’s role as “founder of a non-profit charity for troubled youth”).
7. See id. at 143 (“In 2011, Sandusky was arrested and charged with forty-nine
counts arising from his alleged abuse of ten child victims.”).
8. See Erica M. Kelly, The Jerry Sandusky Effect: Child Abuse Reporting Laws Should
No Longer Be Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 17 U. PITT. L. REV. 209, 212 (2013) (“[Sandusky]
was sentenced to 30 to 60 years in prison, which likely constitutes the equivalent of
a life sentence, as Sandusky was 68-years-old at the time of his sentencing.”).
9. See Will Hobson, Former Penn State President Graham Spanier Sentenced to Jail
for Child Endangerment in Jerry Sandusky Abuse Case, WASH. POST, (Jun. 2, 2017, 3:01
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/06/02/former-
penn-state-president-graham-spanier-sentenced-to-jail-for-child-endangerment-in-
jerry-sandusky-abuse-case/?utm_term=.c4d56c4e75c9 [https://perma.cc/UM3F-
39F9] (quoting Judge John Boccabella, who presided over charges brought against
Graham Spanier, Tim Curley, and Gary Schultz, in regards to his disgust that “[a]ll
three ignored the opportunity to put an end to [Sandusky’s] crimes when they had
the chance to do so”).
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welfare of a child.”10  Investigations into Sandusky’s case revealed
records indicating Spanier, Curley, and Schultz were aware of prior
sexual abuse acts by Sandusky, and that the three officials did not
report such acts to police or any other regulatory authority tasked
with investigating such types of allegations.11  While the men admit-
tedly regret their lack of action upon being made aware of San-
dusky’s suspicious activity with minors, Spanier did not submit a
guilty plea, even though Curley and Schultz did.12  In fact, Spanier
not only went to trial to fight the charges against him, he continued
to resist his responsibility by appealing the trial court’s guilty
verdict.13
Commonwealth v. Spanier14 examined the legal culpability of the
university President who turned a blind-eye to reports of a univer-
sity staff member sexually abusing minors.15  This case discussed du-
ties implicit in Spanier’s job, particularly when he had knowledge
of Sandusky’s actions, including providing protection for known
victims on the university’s campus.16  Spanier’s failure to take fur-
ther action against Sandusky or report the abuse to authorities led
to his child endangerment conviction.17
10. See id. (“Three former Pennsylvania State University administrators, in-
cluding former president Graham Spanier, were each sentenced to serve at least
two months in jail Friday for failing to alert law enforcement about a 2001 incident
involving retired football coach Jerry Sandusky and a boy in a campus shower.”).
11. See FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, supra note 4, at 14 (detailing results R
of extensive investigation into Penn State’s failures to realize and halt Sandusky’s
abuse).  For a further discussion of the Freeh Report, see infra notes 155–165. R
12. See Hobson, supra note 9 (“All three men were convicted of the same mis- R
demeanor charge of child endangerment, but Curley and Schultz both reached
plea agreements and testified at Spanier’s trial in March. . . . The three former
Penn State officials all apologized for their actions and to Sandusky’s victims
before the sentences were handed down.”).
13. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 192 A.3d 141, 142 (“Appellant, Graham B.
Spanier, appeals from the judgment of sentence of four to twelve months of incar-
ceration, imposed June 2, 2017, following a jury trial resulting in his conviction for
one count of endangering the welfare of a child.”).
14. 192 A.3d 141 (Pa. Super. 2018).
15. See id. at 152 (“[O]ur focus is limited to a university president’s duty in the
face of knowledge of allegations of on-campus sexual abuse of minors, in this case
by a high-status former employee with access to campus facilities.”).
16. See id.at 153 (finding duty of care extended to Spanier). For a further
discussion of Spanier’s trial, see infra notes 36–115 and accompanying text. R
17. See id.at 142 (explaining court’s finding of duty based on Spanier having
“occupied a position of high authority with respect to the site of the crime, person-
ally oversaw the university’s response to the allegations, noted to other employees
the risk of not reporting the coach to the police, and had sufficient information
and authority to take action but declined to do so”).  For a further discussion of
Spanier’s child endangerment charge, see infra notes 73–115 and accompanying R
text.
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This Comment argues that the Pennsylvania laws previously in
place were predominantly deficient in protecting children, but revi-
sions made since the incident have greatly increased the responsi-
bility placed on individuals with reason to believe abuse is
occurring.18  This Comment explores whether the level of responsi-
bility Pennsylvania law placed on Penn State employees who were
aware of Sandusky’s child abuse is sufficient in providing justice for
Sandusky’s victims, as well as whether this accountability is adequate
to deter adults in comparable positions from acting similarly.19  De-
spite this increase in protection, this Comment will argue for addi-
tional changes to relevant law in order to further enhance
protection for minors.20  Part II of this comment will provide a
background of child endangerment and mandatory reporting laws
in Pennsylvania.21  Additionally, Part II will specifically discuss
Spanier’s trial, along with the non-criminal consequences resulting
from Sandusky’s crimes.22  Lastly, Part III will analyze the shortcom-
ings of the previous mandated reporting laws in Pennsylvania, as
well as provide suggestions for additional improvements to further
bolster child safety.23
II. WATCHING GAME FILM: REVIEW OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Penn State Football: A Dynasty Under Coach Joe Paterno
Between 2016 and 2017, Penn State University generated over
thirty-five million dollars from sporting event ticket sales alone, of
which football games accounted for over thirty-one million.24  In
total, the football program made over eighty-one million dollars,
the difference of which is accounted for by concession sales, mer-
18. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s mandated reporting laws, see
infra notes 73–154 and accompanying text. R
19. For a further discussion of punishments imposed on these employees, see
infra notes 63–72 and accompanying text. R
20. For a further discussion of suggested revisions to Pennsylvania, and adop-
tion of federal, mandated reporting laws, see infra notes 211–244 and accompany- R
ing text.
21. For a further discussion of child endangerment and mandated reporting
laws in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 73–154 and accompanying text. R
22. For a further discussion of Graham Spanier’s trial, see infra notes 69–115 R
and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the non-legal consequences
faced by Penn State, see infra notes 155–193 and accompanying text. R
23. For a further discussion of mandated reporting law suggestions, see infra
notes 194–244 and accompanying text. R
24. See Sarah Ravacz, Not only is Penn State athletics self-sustaining, it’s making a
profit, CENTRE DAILY TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018, 3:20 PM), https://www.centredaily.com/
sports/college/penn-state-university/article204119879.html (reviewing Penn
State’s 2016–17 NCAA annual Financial Report).
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol27/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 5  2-MAR-20 12:06
2020] WE ARE GUILTY OF FALLING VICTIM TO A HIERARCHY 105
chandise purchases, and media rights among other aspects.25
While Penn State’s reputation as a football powerhouse existed for
decades, this notoriety did not begin until former coach Joe
Paterno joined the team’s leadership.26
During Paterno’s tenure at Penn State, he coached five un-
defeated teams, won two national championships, and won more
games than any other coach in the history of college football.27  In
addition to being the “winningest” coach, Paterno’s notoriety
stemmed from his unprecedented view towards and demand of his
players — that their success in the classroom be equally as impor-
tant as their success on the football field.28  Paterno’s dedication to
the interweaving of academics and athletics proved lucrative when
his football players graduated at a rate of nineteen points above the
national average.29  Further, Paterno was not only known for his
unyielding dedication to Penn State, but for instilling the practice
of humility in his players, regardless of their individual and team
achievements.30  The adoration felt by Penn State students and
25. See Ben Jenkins, Penn State Release Revenue Information for Athletics, DAILY
COLLEGIAN (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.collegian.psu.edu/sports/arti-
cle_e11e9abc-22e7-11e8-a58e-87d56b34320c.html [https://perma.cc/RM93-
C9GZ] (comparing Penn State football team’s revenue to other university’s
teams).
26. See Ivan Maisel & Mark Schlabach, Joe Paterno Leaves Lasting Legacy, ESPN
(Jan. 22, 2012), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/7488107/joe-
paterno-leaves-legacy-penn-state [https://perma.cc/WA79-JKGZ] (noting through
all major changes college football faced during Paterno’s time as coach, Penn
State’s “rise . . . as an athletic and academic power” was most significant).
27. See id. (discussing Paterno’s monumental moments, including 409 games
he won).
28. See id. (summarizing Paterno’s implementation of this unique and ideo-
logical viewpoint, which Paterno himself called “the Grand Experiment”).
29. See id. (“Over the next four-plus decades, Paterno and his university —
and the two became interchangeable in the minds of the nation — made the
Grand Experiment a success.  As late as 2007, the NCAA reported that Penn State
football players graduated at a rate of 74 percent, 19 points above the national
average.”).
30. See id. (providing examples of various more-profitable options presented
to Paterno while at Penn State, as well as discussing simplicity of Penn State’s
uniforms); see also Will Hobson, Six Years Later; Penn State Remains Torn Over the
Sandusky Scandal, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2017/sports/penn-state-six-years-after-sandusky-scandal/?utm_term
=.2d04fb1af668 [https://perma.cc/S5BF-8H46] (“In the venal world of college
football, Paterno built a reputation as a coach who valued integrity over winning –
‘Success with Honor’ was his motto. . . .”).  One opportunity turned down by
Paterno was an offer to become a coach, general manager and part-owner of the
Patriots, a National Football League (NFL) team that now is tied for the most
Super Bowl wins. Id. (emphasizing his unwavering commitment to his collegiate
team).  The job-change would have increased Paterno’s salary from thirty-five
thousand dollars to one point four million dollars. Id. (accentuating his dedica-
tion even when it came to his financial disadvantage).
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alumni towards Paterno was so great that the area directly outside
of the football stadium was designated “Paternoville.”31
Unfortunately, outrage following the news of Sandusky’s ram-
pant abuse was not primarily in reaction to Sandusky’s vicious ac-
tions, but rather in response to the suggestion of Paterno’s
involvement.32  Following Sandusky’s arrest, Penn State fired
Paterno from his job as head coach, removed an on-campus statute
of Paterno , and renamed “Paternoville” as “Nittanyville.”33  Today,
a divide still exists as to whether Paterno should continue to be re-
vered as the “greatest football coach in the history of the game,” or
the coach who allowed his right-hand man to sexually abuse chil-
dren.34 This Comment does not discuss legal consequences Paterno
may have faced in light of his documented awareness of Sandusky’s
criminal behavior, as Paterno passed away two months after San-
dusky’s arrest.35
B. Commonwealth v. Spanier
Other Penn State employees implicated in the Sandusky scan-
dal are Graham Spanier, Tim Curley, and Gary Schultz for their
roles in failing to take appropriate measures upon learning of an
inappropriate incident between Sandusky and a minor.36  Spanier
served as President of Penn State from 1995 to 2011 and Curley
31. See Adam Rittenberg, Paternoville Changes Name to Nittanyville, ESPN (Jul.
17, 2012), http://www.espn.com/blog/bigten/post/_/id/53295/paternoville-
changes-name-to-nittanyville [https://perma.cc/YVR3-93G9] (describing
Paternoville as “tent village[s] set up outside Gate A at Beaver Stadium before
home games”).
32. See Don Van Natta Jr., Joe Paterno Statute Taken Down, ESPN (Jul. 23, 2012),
http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/8188530/joe-paterno-statue-
removed-penn-state-university-beaver-stadium [https://perma.cc/9WMY-YXFF]
(describing disbelief of Penn State fans faced with idea that Paterno was involved
in Sandusky scandal).
33. See Hobson, supra note 30 (discussing controversial actions taken by Penn R
State in immediate response to Sandusky’s indictment); see also CNN Library, supra
note 5 (providing date Paterno was fired – November 9, 2011). R
34. See Katie Reilly, Penn State’s Joe Paterno Tribute Met With Standing Ovation
and Protest, TIME (Sept. 17, 2016), http://time.com/4498286/penn-state-joe-
paterno-tribute/ [https://perma.cc/4E7M-VSGM] (describing conflicting reac-
tions to Penn State’s tribute to Paterno on his fiftieth anniversary as head coach);
see also Time Molloy, Penn State’s Joe Paterno Dead at 85 (Update), REUTERS (Jan. 21,
2012, 9:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUS133807577120120122
[https://perma.cc/CX6U-YSW7] (quoting Urban Meyer as saying “[Joe Paterno]
will go down as the greatest football coach in the history of the game”).
35. See CNN Library, supra note 5 (providing Paterno’s date of death as Jan. R
22, 2012).
36. See Hobson, supra note 9 (referring to sexual assault witnessed by graduate R
assistant Mike McQueary).
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served as Penn State’s athletic director from 1993 to 2011.37  Sch-
ultz had been employed at Penn State since the mid-1970s, and
eventually landed a position as Senior Vice President at the
University.38
1. Delay of Game: University Administrators’ Responses to Prior
Reporting
During the approximately thirteen-years in which Sandusky
abused minors, Penn State administrators were made aware of two
separate instances involving Sandusky and underage boys on the
University’s campus.39  The first instance occurred in 1998 when
Penn State Police received a report from an eleven-year-old boy’s
mother alleging that her child and Sandusky had taken a shower
together.40  While in the shower, the boy had tried to keep his dis-
tance from Sandusky, but was forced into making physical contact
with him, being washed by him, being picked up by him and being
hugged by him.41 Further investigation into the incident revealed
details about additional inappropriate events preceding the
shower.42 A wiretap conversation between the boy’s mother and
Sandusky recorded Sandusky admitting to showering with the boy,
and led to him informing Penn State Police that he had hugged the
boy while they were naked in the shower.43  Although charges were
37. See id. (noting positions of Spanier and Curley at Penn State).
38. See id. (stating Schultz’s position at Penn State).
39. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 192 A.3d 141, 142–43 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(documenting 2001 incident serving as basis for Spanier’s conviction was not  first
time Spanier and other administrators were put on notice about suspect activity
occurring between Sandusky and minor boys).
40. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 132 A.3d 481, 482–83 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(“When Sandusky returned the child to the boy’s home, the child’s mother no-
ticed that his hair was wet and became upset when she discovered that he had
showered with Sandusky.”).
41. See id. at 483 (“The youngster attempted to shower away from Sandusky,
but Sandusky beckoned him closer and told him that he warmed up a shower for
the child.  Sandusky grabbed the boy from around his waist, lifting him into the
air.  He also washed the boy’s back and bear hugged the child from behind, before
rinsing the child’s hair.”).
42. See id. at 482–83 (“On the way to [Penn State], Sandusky placed his right
hand on the boy’s thigh on multiple occasions. . . Sandusky then wrestled with the
victim, before instructing the boy to shower.”).
43. See id. at 483 (“Sandusky admitted to showering naked with the child and
at one point stated that he wished he were dead. He later told police that he
hugged the child in the shower and admitted that it was wrong.”).
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never filed as a result of  this investigation, Spanier, Curley, and
Schultz had received regular updates about the incident.44
In February 2001, less than three years after the initial inci-
dent, Spanier, Curley, and Schultz were made aware of yet another
event involving Sandusky and a young boy.45  In this instance, a
graduate assistant for the football team, Michael McQueary, wit-
nessed Sandusky sexually assaulting a boy in the shower.46  The fol-
lowing day, McQueary reported the incident to Paterno, who in
turn shared the information with University administrators.47
Later, McQueary met directly with both Curley and Schultz to speak
about what he had witnessed.48  The next day, Curley met with
Spanier and Schultz to decide how to proceed with the situation.49
The three of them initially decided Curley would have a discussion
with Sandusky and contact both The Second Mile and the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare.50
After postponing the agreed upon plan for a couple of weeks,
Spanier, Curley, and Schultz eventually decided to change their
course of action and had a conversation with Sandusky to seek his
cooperation before reaching out to other parties.51  Under this new
44. See Spanier, 192 A.3d at 142 (“Schultz and Curley corresponded regularly
by email regarding the investigation.  [Spanier] was a carbon-copy recipient of
some of those emails.  Ultimately, no criminal charges were filed . . . .”).
45. See id. at 143 (“On February 12, 2001, following a routine president’s
council meeting, Curley and Schultz met privately with [Spanier] to discuss San-
dusky.  They discussed the recent incident and the 1998 incident, which [Spanier]
remembered.”).
46. See id. (“On the evening of February 9, 2001, Michael McQueary, a gradu-
ate assistant with the PSU football team, went into the Lasch Building.  He heard
noises and, upon investigating, observed Sandusky sexually assaulting a ten-to
twelve-year-old boy in the shower.”).
47. See id. (“On February 10, 2001, McQueary told head football coach Joe
Paterno about what he had seen.  On February 11, 2001, Paterno contacted Curley,
who in turn informed Schultz.”).
48. See Spanier, 132 A.3d at 483 (“McQueary. . . stated that he told [Curley and
Schultz] that he believed he saw Sandusky having anal sex with a minor boy.”).
49. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 192 A.3d 141, 143 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(“They devised a three-part plan: 1) speaking with Sandusky about appropriate use
of facilities; 2) contacting the director of [The Second Mile]; and 3) contacting
the Department of Public Welfare.”).
50. See id. (“[Spanier] put Curley in charge of executing the plan and keeping
Schultz informed.”); see also Janice Crompton & Timothy McNulty, PSU’s Jerry San-
dusky ‘Found His Victims’ at Second Mile Group Home, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 6,
2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.post-gazette.com/sports/psu/2011/11/06/PSU-s-
Jerry-Sandusky-found-his-victims-at-Second-Mile-group-home/stories/
201111060201 [https://perma.cc/3KHZ-8KVL] (describing Second Mile Founda-
tion charity founded by Sandusky to provide opportunities for at-risk children in
Pennsylvania).
51. See Spanier, 192 A.3d at 143 (“On February 27, 2011, Curley emailed Sch-
ultz and [Spanier] to say that he was no longer comfortable with the original
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strategy of dealing with the allegations internally, Curley would ap-
proach Sandusky and inform him that he was no longer allowed to
use Penn State facilities with boys from The Second Mile.52  When
Curley approached Sandusky about this new prohibition, Sandusky
denied any wrongdoing regarding the event McQueary had alleg-
edly witnessed.53  Curley then reached out to Jack Raykovitz, the
director of The Second Mile, about the accusations and informed
him that Sandusky was forbidden from bringing The Second Mile
boys to Penn State facilities.54  However, Penn State personnel were
not notified of the implementation of this restriction on The Sec-
ond Mile, and therefore, the restriction was not enforced.55  Curley,
Schultz, and Spanier did not bring this matter to anyone’s attention
other than Raykovitz’s.56
Sandusky’s abusive behavior towards the victim that McQueary
observed amounted to criminal conduct and would have been suffi-
cient to justify taking legal action against Sandusky.57  However, the
absence of reporting the incident to the appropriate authorities en-
abled Sandusky to continue abusing minor boys.58  Further, be-
cause Spanier, Curley, and Schultz neglected to invoke the ban
against Sandusky bringing minor boys to the Penn State facilities,
one of those boys was sexually assaulted on the campus.59  This on-
plan. . . [Spanier] supported Curley’s [new] plan, though he observed that if San-
dusky did not cooperate, they would be vulnerable for not having reported the
incident.”).
52. See id. (“Instead, Curley wanted to speak only with Sandusky at first to
advise him to seek professional help, and to tell him he could no longer bring
underage boys to PSU facilities.  If Sandusky cooperated, Schultz, Curley and
[Spanier] would inform only [The Second Mile]; otherwise, they would inform
both [The Second Mile] and [the Department of Public Welfare].”).
53. See id. (“Sandusky denied any wrongdoing when Curley spoke to him.”).
54. See id. (“Curley spoke to Raykovitz and expected Raykovitz to enforce the
limits on Sandusky’s use of PSU facilities, but Curley did not offer Raykovitz any
direction on how to proceed.”).
55. See id. (“Further, Curley did not inform campus police that Sandusky was
not permitted to bring children into the facilities, or inform any other PSU person-
nel that they should enforce this rule.  McQueary continued to observe Sandusky
in the Lasch Building after hours.”).
56. See id. (“After speaking with Sandusky and Raykovitz, Curley informed
[Spanier] and Schultz that he had done so. Curley never contacted [the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare], Children and Youth Services, or the police.”).
57. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3123(b) (2003) (“A person commits involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse with a child, a felony of the first degree, when the per-
son engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 13
years of age.”).
58. See Spanier, 192 A.3d at 143 (“Sandusky subsequently abused at least four
more young boys, including one in the Lasch Building shower in the summer of
2002.”).
59. See id. (identifying Lasch Building as on-campus facility).
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campus assault occurred in the same shower as the previous inci-
dent McQueary witnessed  just one year earlier.60  This boy was one
of four known victims of abuse committed by Sandusky following
McQueary’s initial report in 2001.61
2. Off-Sides Penalty: Legal Implications for the “Sideline Players” of the
Assault
When it came time to face the consequences of their inaction,
Spanier, Curley, and Schultz were given a five-yard penalty for a
violation that later became a fifteen-yard offense.62  Trials for each
of the three men for their involvement in the cover up of San-
dusky’s child abuse were originally scheduled for March 2017.63
However, one week prior to Spanier’s anticipated trial date, Curley
and Schultz each pled guilty to one misdemeanor count of endan-
gering the welfare of a child.64  Although initially charged with per-
jury, obstruction of justice, conspiracy, failure to report suspected
child abuse, and endangering the welfare of children, many of
these charges were dropped prior to trial.65  Both Curley and Sch-
ultz were sentenced to a maximum of twenty-three months in
prison.66  However, Curley was given a seven-month minimum,
60. See id. at 143 n.3 (“The victim, John Doe, testified at [Spanier’s] trial that
in the summer of 2002, when he was approximately twelve or thirteen years old,
Sandusky sexually assaulted him in the shower at the Lasch Building.”).
61. See id. at 143 (noting that out of the ten total child victims Sandusky faced
prosecution for four of them occurred after McQueary’s report).
62. See Hobson, supra note 9 (listing limited sentences for each person). R
63. See Charles Thompson, Tim  Curley, Gary Schultz Plead Guilty in Sandusky
Coverup Case, PENN LIVE, https://www.pennlive.com/news/2017/03/tim_curley_
files_plea_in_sandu.html [https://perma.cc/J5N4-7QEM] (updated Jan. 5, 2019)
(“The case has been winding its way toward trial for four years[.]”).
64. See id. (“[Curley and Schultz guilty pleas were entered] just a week before
all three men – Spanier, Schultz and Curley – were scheduled to stand trial on
accusations they were criminally negligent in handling child-sex accusations
against Sandusky in 2001.”).
65. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 132 A.3d 481, 482 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“We
find that Ms. Baldwin breached the attorney-client privilege and was incompetent
to testify as to the confidential communications between her and Spanier during
her grand jury testimony.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s determination
otherwise, and quash the charges of perjury, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy
related to those counts.”).  Cynthia Baldwin had expressed to Spanier that she
would represent him before the grand jury. Id. at 484 (following receipt of
Spanier’s subpoena).  However, Ms. Baldwin later stated that she only represented
Penn State, and not any University administrators. Id. at 485 (contradicting her
prior statement when court asked for clarification).
66. See Hobson, supra note 9 (“Former university athletic director Tim Curley, R
63, received a sentence of seven to 23 months, with three months in jail, while
former former [sic] vice president Gary Schultz, 67, was sentenced to six to 23
months, with two months in jail.”).
10
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol27/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 11  2-MAR-20 12:06
2020] WE ARE GUILTY OF FALLING VICTIM TO A HIERARCHY 111
while Schultz was given a six-month minimum.67  This minor varia-
tion between the sentences was likely the result of Curley’s responsi-
bilities in “executing” the reporting plan in response to the
McQueary incident, whereas Schultz had only been updated about
the progress by Curley.68
Although Curley and Schultz entered guilty pleas, Spanier pro-
ceeded to trial.69  At trial in March 2017, after being charged with
two counts of endangering the welfare of a child, and one count of
conspiracy to endanger the welfare of a child, Spanier was found
guilty of one charge of endangering the welfare of a child.70  Fol-
lowing his sentencing of four to twelve months, Spanier appealed
his conviction.71  In his appeal, Spanier argued that his guilty ver-
dict should be overturned for various reasons, including that the
appropriate statute of limitations had expired and he did not owe
the child a duty of care.72
3. Personal Foul: Endangering the Welfare of a Child
Under Pennsylvania law, a person is guilty of endangering the
welfare of a child if the person “knowingly endangers the welfare of
the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support.”73
Under the same statute, Pennsylvania law specifies that a person
may be guilty of endangering the welfare of a child if the person is
“[a] parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a
child under 18 years of age, or a person that employs or supervises,
such a person . . . .”74  The statute further clarifies a “person super-
vising the welfare of a child” as “a person other than a parent or
guardian that provides care, education, training or control of a
67. See id. (providing sentences for Curley and Schultz).
68. For further discussion of Curley’s and Schultz’s reporting plan, see supra
notes 51–56 and accompanying text. R
69. See Hobson, supra note 9 (“In a surprise, Spanier – the only one of the R
three to take his case to trial earlier this year – actually received the lightest
sentence.”).
70. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 192 A.3d 141, 144 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(“[T]he jury found [Spanier] had not engaged in a course of conduct with respect
to the EWOC conviction, resulting in a conviction for a misdemeanor rather than
a felony.”).
71. See id. (“On June 2, 2017, the court sentenced [Spanier] to four to twelve
months of incarceration followed by two years of probation. This timely appeal
followed.”).
72. See id. at 144–45 (listing questions submitted by Spanier to Appellate
Court for review challenging accuracy of trial court’s results).
73. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4304(a)(1) (2017) (defining child endangerment).
74. Id. (indicating who is subject to adherence of statute).
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child.”75  Additionally, a person is guilty of the same offense “if the
person, in an official capacity, prevents or interferes with the mak-
ing of a report of suspected child abuse” to child protective services
in accordance with Pennsylvania law.76
a. Possession of the Ball: A Duty of Care
The Pennsylvania statute defining child endangerment was
amended in 2007 to include “a person who employs or supervises
such a person” in the provision regarding who may be found guilty
of the offense.77  This amendment was a result of Commonwealth v.
Lynn,78 a case brought against a “high-ranking official in the Arch-
diocese of Philadelphia” for his failure to take action against priests
sexually abusing children.79  Initially, the grand jury in this case rec-
ommended against charging Lynn with child endangerment be-
cause “the statute was written too narrowly to sustain criminal
charges against high-level Archdiocesan officials.”80  However, the
resulting decision not only convicted Lynn of child endangerment,
but increased protections for future child victims due to requests
for legislators to revise the statute based on the holding in Lynn.81
75. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4304(a)(3) (2017) (broadening liability under
statute).
76. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4304(a)(2) (2017) (signifying that statute accountabil-
ity is not restricted solely to those supervising).
77. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 192 A.3d 141, 151–52 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(“[T]he General Assembly amended § 4304 in 2007 to add the [italicized] clause:
A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18
years of age, or a person who employs or supervises such a person, commits an offense if
he knowingly endangers the welfare of a child by violating a duty of care, protec-
tion or support.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. 114 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2015).
79. See Spanier, 192 A.3d at 151–52 (“Lynn’s conduct predated the 2007
amendment of the EWOC statute . . . .  In response, the General Assembly
amended § 4304 . . . .”).
80. Id. (summarizing Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to convict Lynn,
even though he was not directly in charge of children, against grand jury’s recom-
mendation to not bring charges against Lynn under § 4304).  The version of the
statute in place at the time of Lynn’s prosecution provided that someone could not
be guilty of endangering the welfare of a child unless that person directly super-
vised the child, which Lynn did not. Id. (interpreting statute narrowly and in de-
fendant’s favor).  The Lynn decision disregarded the narrowness of the statute and
found him guilty regardless of his indirect supervisory role. Id. (taking more com-
prehensive approach to statute’s language).  After the Lynn holding, the statute
was amended in accordance with the decision, expanding the statute to those who
not only supervise children, but the supervisors of those who directly supervise
children. Id. (emphasizing child’s welfare, rather than child themselves, as target
of statute’s protection).
81. See id. at 151–52 (discussing Lynn’s holding and resulting statutory
amendment).
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In Lynn, the Archdiocesan official who was charged insisted he
was innocent because he did not directly supervise any children,
and therefore did not have a duty of care.82  The court articulated
its understanding of the child endangerment statute as not having a
limited applicability solely to persons who personally supervise chil-
dren.83  Rather, the court felt that whether a person actually inter-
acts with a child is not indicative of their liability under the
statute.84  Under this interpretation, a person who oversees those
acting as chaperones for the child still carries a duty to protect the
child’s welfare.85  The court in Lynn also advocated for the necessity
of this perception, stating “[s]upervision is routinely accomplished
through subordinates, and is no less supervisory if it does not in-
volve personal encounters with the children.”86  The current statu-
tory amendment was added after the Lynn holding in order to
clarify the broadening scope of accountability for child
endangerment.87
Similar to Lynn, Spanier argued on appeal that he was wrong-
fully convicted of child endangerment because the court had not
applied the appropriate child endangerment statute to his case.88
Spanier based this argument on the notion that “state and federal
constitutions prohibit the government from imposing punishment
for conduct that was not criminal at the time of the conduct but was
later criminalized.”89  Under this contention, Spanier argued the
court should have looked to the version of the child endangerment
statute in place at the time of his neglectful actions when consider-
82. See id. at 151 (reasoning that Lynn did not have to directly supervise chil-
dren to be found guilty; rather, Court found that there was still enough to convict
because he was “specifically responsible for protecting children from sexually abu-
sive priests.”).
83. See id. (discussing interpretation and application of statute).
84. See id. (providing reason for liability).
85. See Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 798 (Pa. 2015) (finding that
“requiring supervision of the child’s welfare rather than of the child, the statute
endeavors to safe-guard the emotional, psychological, and physical well-being of
children”).
86. Id. at 824. (discussing supervisory role).
87. See Spanier, 192 A.3d at 151 (“In response, the General Assembly amended
§ 4304 to add . . . ‘or a person who employs or supervises such a person’” to those
who are responsible under child endangerment statute).
88. See id. at 145 (“In 2001, when the alleged conduct at issue here occurred,
the child-endangerment statute did not encompass someone who was employing
or supervising someone else who was supervising the welfare of a minor child. . .
To the extent [Spanier’s] child-endangerment conviction was based on his alleged
employment or supervision of someone else who was supervising the welfare of a
child, did the trial court err[?]”).
89. Id. (distinguishing his actions from criminal activity based on governing
criminal statute at time his actions occurred).
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ing whether he was guilty.90  The activity under scrutiny in front of
the court occurred in 2001, and therefore, Spanier asserted the ver-
sion of the statute effective at the time of the incident did not in-
clude the clause “or a person who employs or supervises such a
person,” is the proper law to apply in his prosecution.91  The Court
applied the Lynn decision, and concluded the question of whether
Spanier directly supervised Sandusky’s victims or anyone else who
interacted with the boys, was immaterial in determining his guilt.92
The Superior Court further concluded that Spanier was guilty
of endangering the welfare of a child, regardless of which version of
the statute applied.93  When citing relevant precedent to support its
decision, the court included excerpts from previous cases that em-
phasized the expansive applicability of the statute.94  In its decision
of the Lynn case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained
that, while most statutes’ ambiguous nature is generally read in
favor of a presumption of innocence of the accused, the child en-
dangerment statute is an exception to the rule.95  In support of its
decision, the Court explicitly stated:
[T]he statute [under review] is protective in nature, and
must be construed to effectuate its broad purpose of shel-
tering children from harm. . . The common sense of the
community, as well as the sense of decency, propriety and
90. See id. (noting applied version of statute did not come into effect until six
years after).
91. See id. (indicating that Spanier cannot be found guilty for something
which was not criminalized, and therefore, he should not be held to acting as if he
should have known such act was criminal).
92. See id. at 154 (“Here . . . there is no evidence that [Spanier] supervised
anyone who interacted directly with Sandusky’s minor victims. As we have already
explained above, the Lynn Court held that § 4304 applies to persons who supervise
a child’s welfare, not persons who supervise a child. The absence of direct interac-
tion between [Spanier], Shultz, or Curley and Sandusky’s victims therefore does
not preclude [Spanier’s] conviction under the pre-2007 version of § 4304 as con-
strued in Lynn.”).
93. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 192 A.3d 141, 154 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“Re-
garding the EWOC conviction, we have concluded that the language added in
2007 or, more appropriately, the language not included in the pre-2007 version,
does not alter the result here.”).
94. See id. at 150 (“Specifically, the purpose of such juvenile statutes is defen-
sive; they are written expansively by the legislature to cover a broad range of con-
duct in order to safeguard the welfare and security of our children.” (quoting
Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 818 (Pa. 2015))).
95. See Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 818 (Pa. 2015) (“Generally
speaking, under the rule of lenity, penal statutes are to be strictly construed, with
ambiguities resolved in favor of the accused. In the peculiar context of EWOC,
however, we have held that the statute is protective in nature, and must be con-
strued to effectuate its broad purpose of sheltering children from harm.”).
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the morality which most people entertain is sufficient to
apply the statute to each particular case, and to individu-
ate what particular conduct is rendered criminal by it.96
b. Time Left on the Clock: Statute of Limitations
Another defense Spanier presented in opposition to his convic-
tion was that the applicable statute of limitations had expired and,
therefore, he was precluded from receiving a guilty verdict.97  As
was the case with the child endangerment statute, Spanier believed
the incorrect statute of limitations was applied during his trial.98
This assertion was based upon two theories: (1) the subsection de-
tailing exceptions to the general statute of limitations was substan-
tially amended subsequent to the 2001 events being examined at
trial; and, (2) the defendant had not engaged in the classification
of activity necessary for an exception to the statute of limitations to
be considered.99
Pennsylvania statute section 5552(a) provides that “prosecu-
tion for an offense must be commenced within two years after it is
committed” unless the crime committed is included in the statute’s
exceptions.100  Currently, section 5552(c)(3) specifies that “[a]ny
sexual offense committed against a minor who is less than 18 years
of age any time up to the later of the period of limitation provided
by law after the minor has reached 18 years of age or the date the
minor reaches 50 years of age.”101  The subsection continues to de-
fine  “sexual assault” by listing a variety of pertinent offenses, in-
cluding “Section 4304 (relating to endangering the welfare of
96. Id. (explaining court’s interpretation of statute as broadly encompassing
acts that may not otherwise be criminalized under narrow reading of statute).
97. See Spanier, 192 A.3d at 146 (“The Commonwealth filed its complaint
against [Spanier] on November 1, 2012, more than eleven years after the February
9, 2001 offense and well outside of the general two-year limitations period of
§ 5552(a).”).
98. See id. at 147 (noting Spanier asserted prosecution as untimely).
99. See id. at 147–48 (reviewing Spanier’s arguments set out to avoid court’s
finding of prosecution as timely).
100. See id. at 146 (“If the period prescribed in subsection (a). . . has expired,
a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for [exceptions].”); see also 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 5552(c) (2014) (enumerating multiple exceptions to general statute
of limitations).
101. 42 Pa. Const. Stat § 5552(c)(3) (emphasizing inadequacy of two-year stat-
ute of limitations for offenses against minors); see also Spanier, 192 A.3d at 146
(providing manner of calculating this law’s statute of limitations).
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children).”102  On appeal, Spanier argued the version of section
5552 effective at the time of the 2001 offense should have been
applied, rather than the current version.103  The prior statute as-
serted the applicable statute of limitations exception was “for a sex-
ual offense committed against a minor less than 18 years of age,
prosecution could be commenced within two years after the vic-
tim’s 18th birthday.”104  The lower and Superior Court, however,
did not find Spanier’s argument persuasive because the victim of
the 2001 incident had not yet surpassed eighteen by the time the
revised and more protective version of section 5552(c)(3) was
implemented.105
At trial, the jury found Spanier guilty of misdemeanor child
endangerment, as opposed to the higher degree felony child en-
dangerment charge brought by the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania.106  In order to convict for a felony offense of  child
endangerment, the jury needed to find that Spanier engaged in a
“course of conduct,” which they did not.107  Spanier incorrectly rea-
soned that this lack of “course of conduct” finding should bar his
conviction altogether.108   However, Pennsylvania law does not sup-
port such reasoning given that a finding of a child endangerment
102. § 5552(c)(3) (informing various avenues one may be implicated under
crimes of sexual assault of minor); see also Spanier, 192 A.3d at 146 (highlighting
only offense listed in subsection relative to review of this case).
103. See Spanier, 192 A.3d at 144-47 (noting that current version of statute
took effect in 2007).
104. Id. at 147 (“Pursuant to the version of § 5552(c)(3) extant at the time of
the 2001 offense, therefore, the Commonwealth had until two years after the vic-
tim’s 18th birthday to commence this prosecution against [Spanier].”).
105. See id. (“At trial, the Commonwealth presented unchallenged evidence
that the victim was 10 to 12 years old at the time of his February 9, 2001 sexual
assault. Therefore, on January 29, 2007, when the current version of § 5552(c)(3)
took effect, the victim was no more than 18 years old. Because the existing statute
had yet to expire at the time of its amendment, the amended statute applies to this
prosecution.”).
106. See id. at 146 (“Established Pennsylvania law states a defendant can be
convicted of a crime that was not actually charged when the uncharged offense is a
lesser-included offense of the charged crime. As long as the conviction is for a
lesser-included offense, the defendant will have been put on notice of the charges
against him and can adequately prepare a defense.” (quoting Commonwealth v.
Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 449–50 (Pa. Super. 2014))).
107. See id. (“At trial the Commonwealth sought a felony conviction for
EWOC under § 4304(b)(1)(ii), which requires proof that the perpetrator engaged
in a course of conduct. . . The jury, however, found no course of conduct and
therefore found [Spanier] guilty of the lesser-included misdemeanor offense
under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4304(b)(1)(i).”).
108. See id. at 147 (“While it is true the jury’s rejection of a course of conduct
defeated the Commonwealth’s attempt to secure a conviction for EWOC as a fel-
ony, [Spanier’s] argument that the rejection of a course of conduct finding ren-
dered this prosecution untimely is misplaced.”).
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misdemeanor charge does not require the jury to find that the de-
fendant participated in a “course of conduct.”109
Additionally, Spanier sought reconsideration of his conviction
on the basis of him not actually abusing the minors.110  While the
statute of limitations exception does apply directly to sexual of-
fenses against minors, section 5552(c)(3) specifically cites sexual as-
sault as encompassing the child endangerment statute.111  The
child endangerment statute lacks a requirement that the accused
must have been the actual abuser in order to be found guilty.112
Moreover, when analyzing the child endangerment statute, the
court underscored its finding of the statute as one that is broad and
protective in nature, and therefore directed its interpretation in
favor of protecting children.113  Further, the appellate court refer-
enced Pennsylvania law, which indicated that a statute articulated
with sufficient specificity will not be construed as ambiguous under
judicial review.114  For these reasons, the appellate court affirmed
the correct statute of limitations was applied in the district court.115
109. See Commonwealth v. Spanier, 192 A.3d 141 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting
difference in elements that must be proven based on degree of conviction).
110. See id. at 149 (“[Spanier] also seeks to avoid the application of
§ 5552(c)(3) by arguing that he did not personally commit a sexual offense.”).
111. See id. at 146 (“Any sexual offense committed against a minor who is less
than 18 years of age. . . As used in this paragraph, the term ‘sexual offense’ means
a crime under the following provisions. . . Section 4304 (relating to endangering
welfare of children)” (quoting Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5552(c)(3) (2019))).
112. See § 4304(a)(1) (“A parent, guardian or other person supervising the
welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a person that employs or supervises
such a person, commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the
child by violating a duty of care, protection or support.”); see also Spanier, 192 A.3d
at 150 (“Furthermore, § 4304, by its clear terms, does not require sexual miscon-
duct on the part of the perpetrator.”).
113. See Spanier, 192 A.3d at 150 (“[W]e have held that the statute is protective
in nature, and must be construed to effectuate its broad purpose of sheltering
children from harm.”).
114. See id. (“[Spanier] would have us find statutory ambiguity where none
exists, a course of action not permissible under the rules of statutory construction.
1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1921(b) (‘When the words of the statute are free and clear from
all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing
its spirit.’).”).
115. See id. (“Because § 5502(c)(3) clearly lists EWOC as a sexual offense, and
because EWOC does not require the perpetrator to be the person committing sex-
ual abuse, [Spanier]’s argument fails.”).
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C. Defense Wins Championships: Responsive Revisions to
Pennsylvania’s Mandated Reporting Laws
1. The Referees: Required Reporters
Pennsylvania law mandates certain groups of individuals report
suspected child abuse and specifically enumerates which groups are
required to report instances of abuse.116  Some individuals include
social service agency employees, school employees, foster parents,
and leaders of religious organizations.117  Under the statute, those
obligated to report suspected child abuse must only do so if they
have “reasonable cause” to believe abuse is occurring.118
Categorizations of those required to report under Pennsylvania
law were not always as broad as they are now.119  Changes resulting
in this over-inclusivity have occurred in the last five years.120  Previ-
ously, Pennsylvania statute section 6311(a) specifically included
school nurses, teachers, and administrators.121  Notably, this version
of the statute did not include coaches or any school personnel
other than administrators, teachers, and nurses.122  Currently, the
statute imposes the duty to report on any “school employee,” cast-
ing a wider net of responsibility throughout the institution and
hopefully resulting in less cases of child abuse going unreported.123
The inaction of Spanier and others who had knowledge of San-
dusky’s behavior sheds light on the importance of both mandating
reporting by individuals who have knowledge of sexual misconduct
and compelling bystanders through a legal obligation to protect
116. See 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6311(a) (specifying an exclusive list through use
of the word following in the state: “[t]he following adults shall make a report of
suspected child abuse . . . ”); see also Kelly, supra note 8, at  213 (“It is notable that
Pennsylvania is currently one of 32 states that limits who is required to report sus-
pected abuse by including this list of ‘mandated reporters.’”).
117. See § 6311(a)(1)–(16) (providing examples of only four out of sixteen
categories listed as appointed as “Mandated Reporters”).
118. See id. (“The following adults shall make a report of suspected child
abuse. . . if the person has reasonable cause to suspect that a child is a victim of
child.”).
119. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 216 (“In Pennsylvania, there have been several R
proposed revisions to the statute enumerating mandated reporters of child abuse
since November 15, 2011 (notably 10 days after Sandusky was arrested).”).
120. See § 6311 (noting effective date of July 1, 2015).
121. See § 6303 (current version at 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6311(b) (2015)) (ac-
centuating previously much smaller scale of mandated reporters).
122. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 216  (“On [November 15, 2011], the Senate R
proposed to add ‘school staff member,’ ‘school faculty,’ and ‘coach’ to
§ 6311(b).”).
123. See § 6311(a)(4) (“The following adults shall make a report of suspected
child abuse. . . if the person has reasonable cause to suspect that a child is a victim
of child abuse. . . [a] school employee.”).
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children.124  The conversations had by members of the Penn State
administration behind closed doors represent the exact problems
associated with not reporting this type of behavior.125
2. Throwing Flags: The Reporting Process
Pursuant to Pennsylvania statute section 6311(c), when a per-
son required to report suspected child abuse is acting in their “ca-
pacity as a member of the staff of a . . . school,” they must first act in
accordance with the “reporting procedures” detailed in section
6313.126  The reporting procedures necessitate the mandated re-
porter to immediately make an oral or written report to Child Pro-
tective Services (“CPS”).127  Further, the statute dictates that,
should someone choose to make an oral report, such reporter must
follow-up by submitting a written report within forty-eight hours of
the oral report to CPS.128  Following the oral and written submis-
sions, the reporter must then “immediately notify the person in
charge of the . . . school” of the suspected abuse.129  Once the per-
son in charge is made aware of the reporter’s suspicion, that person
is then tasked with ensuring the organization is cooperating ade-
quately in the investigation.130
Similar to expanding the list of persons identified as mandated
reporters, Pennsylvania law has also significantly developed the pre-
scribed process for these reporters in attempt to reduce cases that
124. For further discussion of the Penn State administration’s inaction and
the consequences, see infra notes 40–62 and accompanying text.
125. For further discussion of the duty of care and the importance of report-
ing, see infra notes 78–98 and accompanying text.
126. See § 6311(c) (“Whenever a person is required to report . . . in the capac-
ity as a member of the staff of a medical or other public or private institution,
school, facility or agency, that person shall report immediately in accordance with
section 6313 . . . .”).
127. See § 6313(a)(1) (“A mandated reporter shall immediately make an oral
report of suspected child abuse to the department via the Statewide toll-free tele-
phone number . . . or a written report using electronic technologies . . . .”).
128. See § 6313(a)(2) (“A mandated reporter making an oral report . . . of
suspected child abuse shall also make a written report, which may be submitted
electronically, within 48 hours to the department or county agency assigned to the
case in a manner and format prescribed by the department.”).
129. See § 6311(c) (“Whenever a person is required to report . . . that person
shall report immediately in accordance with section 6313 and shall immediately
thereafter notify the person in charge of the institution, school, facility or agency
or the designated agent of the person in charge.”).
130. See id. (“Upon notification, the person in charge or the designated
agent, if any, shall facilitate the cooperation of the institution, school, facility or
agency with the investigation of the report. Any intimidation, retaliation or ob-
struction in the investigation of the report is subject to [penalties under Penn-
sylvania law].”).
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otherwise may have fallen through the cracks.131  Most notably, re-
porters are now instructed to directly communicate with CPS.132
Before its most recent amendment, section 6311 required reporting
to CPS in much more limited circumstances.133  In the previous ver-
sion, only people “who, in the course of employment, occupation
or practice of a profession, [came] into contact with children” were
required to notify CPS of the suspected abuse.134  The statute set
out a different approach for the remainder of those listed as “per-
sons required to report.”135  Rather than file a report directly with
CPS, as well as a subsequent report with senior personnel at their
school, section 6311(c) instructed required reporters to simply tell
the person in charge of the school about the suspected abuse.136  At
that point, the person in charge would “assume the responsibility
and have the legal obligation to report or cause a report to be made
. . . .”137
3. Loss of Yardage: Penalties Imposed
A major distinction between required reporters and en-
couraged or voluntary reporters is the repercussions at stake for
failing to report an incident.138  With the development of section
131. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 217 (“The legislature also proposed revisions to R
the reporting procedure . . . .”).
132. See id. (emphasizing CPS’s heightened role).
133. See id. at 215 (“Under [Pennsylvania’s] current law . . . football coach Joe
Paterno . . . only had a duty to report to someone above him in the school’s
hierarchy.”).
134. See § 6311(a) (“Persons who, in the course of their employment, occupa-
tion or practice of their profession, come into contact with children shall report or
cause a report to be made in accordance with section 6313 (relating to reporting
procedure) when they have reason to believe, on the basis of their medical, profes-
sional or other training and experience, that a child coming before them in their
professional or official capacity is an abused child.”).
135. See § 6311 (2007) (current version at § 6311(c)) (referring to differences
between “general rule” and specifically described staff members’ obligations).
136. See id. (“Whenever a person is required to report . . . in the capacity as a
member of the staff of a medical or other public or private institution, school,
facility or agency, that person shall immediately notify the person in charge of the
institution, school, facility or agency or the designated agent of the person in
charge.”).
137. Id. (“Upon notification, the person in charge or the designated agent, if
any, shall assume the responsibility and have the legal obligation to report or cause
a report to be made in accordance with section 6313.  This chapter does not re-
quire more than one report from any such institution, school, facility or agency.”).
138. See Anna Stolley Persky, The Penn State Scandal: Child Abuse Reporting Laws,
26 WASH. LAW. 23, 28 (2012) (“Pennsylvania lawmakers . . . are looking at tougher
penalties for individuals who have a duty to report, but fail to do so.”).
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6311 came reforms to section 6319, which outlines potential penal-
ties required reporters face if they forego their legal obligations.139
Pennsylvania has consistently used a tiered system to determine
the appropriate punishment for a required reporter neglecting
their reporting duty.140  Originally, section 6319 treated an individ-
ual’s first failure to report equivalent to low-level crimes, such as
loitering and disorderly conduct.141  Any violations following the
first offense were characterized as a third-degree misdemeanor.142
The first reformation of section 6319 converted the penalties for a
first offense to a third-degree misdemeanor and for any subsequent
offenses to second-degree misdemeanors.143  Presently, the statute
does not solely differentiate degrees of punishment based on the
number of violations committed.144  There are now two subsections
detailing events in which a required reporter’s failure to disclose
child abuse may result in a felony charge.145  One instance in which
a reporter may be charged with a felony is if the reporter “willfully
fails” to report child abuse they had “direct knowledge” of, and
such abuse amounted to at least a felony of the first degree.146 The
139. See id. at 28 (“Pennsylvania lawmakers are discussing changing the re-
quirements on to whom a report must be made. They also are looking at tougher
penalties for individuals who have a duty to report, but fail to do so.”); see also
§§ 6311, 6319 (noting effective dates of most recent versions are December 31,
2014 and July 1, 2015).
140. See § 6319 (regulating required reporters’ penalties consistently based on
number of times reporter had duty to report but did not).
141. See § 6319 (2007, 2014) (current version at 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6311(b)
(2015)) (“A person or official required by this chapter to report a case of sus-
pected child abuse who willfully fails to do so commits a summary offense for the
first violation . . . .”); see also Summary Offenses in Pennsylvania, CMTY. LEGAL SERVS.,
(Apr. 22, 2014), https://clsphila.org/learn-about-issues/dealing-summary-offenses
[https://perma.cc/4K62-ZUWA] (“A summary offense if the most minor type of
criminal offense in Pennsylvania, and is often called a ‘non-traffic citation.’ A con-
viction for a summary offense usually results in a fine.”).
142. See § 6319 (“A person or official required by this chapter to report a case
of suspected child abuse who willfully fails to do so commits a summary offense for
the first violation and a misdemeanor of the third degree for a second or subse-
quent violation.”).
143. See id. (“A person or official required by this chapter to report a case of
suspected child abuse or to make a referral to the appropriate authorities who
willfully fails to do so commits a misdemeanor of the third degree for the first
violation and a misdemeanor of the second degree for a second or subsequent
violation.”).  This version became effective in 2007. Id. (noting date of
enactment).
144. See § 6319(a)(3) (“An offense not otherwise specified in paragraph (2)
[as a felony of the third degree] is a misdemeanor of the second degree.”).
145. See § 6319 (detailing penalties based on their corresponding offense
and/or degree).
146. See § 6319(a)(2) (“An offense under this section is a felony of the third
degree if: (i) the person or official willfully fails to report; (ii) the child abuse
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second way a reporter can be charged with a felony is by a showing
of repetitive failure to report child abuse.147  Furthermore,
mandatory reporters may be subject to lesser-included charges of
misdemeanors in the first or second degree.148
Additionally, the current version of section 6319 is the first to
address the statute of limitations for the offenses.149  Prior to this
version’s enactment, it could be inferred that the general statute of
limitations would have been applied.150  During the effective peri-
ods of the previous versions of section 6319, the statute of limita-
tions for bringing suit against an abuser for the physical assault of a
minor was five years after the child’s eighteenth birthday, and sub-
sequently extended to twelve years after the child’s eighteenth
birthday.151  Accordingly, a mandated reporter who failed to report
suspected child abuse would not face legal punishment if the victim
did not disclose their abuse until after two years had passed.152  The
Pennsylvania legislature acknowledged this potentially unsatisfac-
tory consequence and, in turn, included a statute of limitations pro-
constitutes a felony of the first degree or higher; and (iii) the person or official has
direct knowledge of the nature of the abuse.”).
147. See § 6319(c) (“A person who commits a second or subsequent offense
under subsection (a) commits a felony of the third degree, except that if the child
abuse constitutes a felony of the first degree or higher, the penalty for the second
or subsequent offenses is a felony of the second degree.”).
148. See § 6319(a)(3) (“An offense not otherwise specified in paragraph (2)
[as a felony of the third degree] is a misdemeanor of the second degree.”); see also
§ 6319(b) (“If a person’s willful failure under subsection (a) continues while the
person knows or has reasonable cause to believe the child is actively being sub-
jected to child abuse, the person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree[.]”).
149. See § 6319 (lacking any reference to statute of limitations).
150. See § 5552–5553 (2019) (providing statute of limitations of two years for
misdemeanors and thirty days for summary offenses).
151. See § 5552(c)(3) (“If the period prescribed. . . has expired, a prosecution
may nevertheless be commenced for. . . any sexual offense committed against a
minor who is less than 18 years of age any time up to the period  of limitation
provided by law after the minor has reached 18 years of age.”); see also § 5552(b.1)
(“A prosecution for any of the following offenses . . . must be commenced within
12 years after it is committed . . . sexual abuse of children.”);  § 5552(b) (“A prose-
cution for any of the following offenses must be commenced within five years after
it is committed. . . sexual abuse of children.”).
152. See Alyssa Choiniere, Local experts say shame, trauma delay reporting of child
sex abuse, HERALD STANDARD (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.heraldstandard.com/
new_today/local-experts-say-shame-trauma-delay-reporting-of-child-sex/article_
e8bbb195-099d-55ee-ac32-0e8c252c90cd.html (“It is common for victims to come
. . . for counseling and other services after the statute of limitations has passed[.]
Sometimes victims report sexual assault to the district attorney’s office beyond the
statute of limitations[.]”).  Consider this untimely reporting, which, when applied
to previous versions of § 5552, already gave a child who had been sexually as-
saulted up until thirty years of age to report the abuse, as opposed to the mere two
years previously allotted for penalizing mandated reporters’ offenses (comparing
inconsistent attributions of time for offenses revolving around identical events).
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vision in the most recently enacted section 6319.153  This provision
asserts that the statute of limitations for charging a mandatory re-
porter who neglects to report suspected child abuse may be based
on the statute of limitations of either the crime committed by the
abuser, or five years after the minor’s eighteenth birthday, which-
ever is greater.154
D. Penn State’s New Play Book: The Freeh Report
Recommendations
Following the outrage that erupted once Sandusky’s actions be-
came public knowledge, Penn State’s Board of Trustees hired the
law firm of Louis Freeh, a former federal judge and director of the
FBI, to conduct an internal investigation.155  Specifically, this inves-
tigation’s aim was to identify omissions and oversights within the
University’s hierarchy system of reporting and recognition of
abuse.156  The report (hereinafter the “Freeh Report”) concludes
with recommendations for the University to implement in order to
ensure such failures will not be repeated in the future.157
The Freeh Report began its description of the investigation’s
findings boldly: “The most saddening finding by the Special Investi-
gative Counsel is the total and consistent disregard by the most se-
nior leaders at Penn State for the safety and welfare of Sandusky’s
child victims.”158  In the explanation of its findings, the report dis-
153. See § 6319(d) (containing a new subsection solely addressing statute of
limitations, effective December 31, 2014).
154. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat.  § 6319(d) (emphasizing change in statute).
155. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 211 (“On July 12, 2012, Louis J. Freeh, a former
director of the F.B.I. hired by Penn State trustees, issued a report. . . explaining the
failures of top officials in the chain of command at Penn State.”); see also Will
Hobson, Six Years Later; Penn State Remains Torn Over the Sandusky scandal, WASH.
POST (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/sports/
penn-state-six-years-after-sandusky-scandal/?utm_term=.2d04fb1af668 (“A former
federal judge who led the FBI from 1993 until 2001, Freeh had entered the lucra-
tive world of leading internal investigations for troubled organizations. This assign-
ment, which earned his firm $8.3 million, was his most high-profile case.”).
156. See Freeh Report, supra note 11, at 8 (“FSS was asked to perform an inde- R
pendent, full and complete investigation of: the alleged failure of Pennsylvania
State University personnel to respond to, and report to the appropriate authori-
ties, the sexual abuse of children by former University football coach . . . ; the
circumstances  under which such abuse could occur in University facilities or
under the auspices of University programs for youth.”).
157. See id. (“In addition, the Special Investigative Counsel was asked to pro-
vide recommendations regarding University governance, oversight, and adminis-
trative policies and procedures that will better enable the University to prevent and
more effectively respond to incidents of sexual abuse of minors in the future.”).
158. Id. at 14 (condemning Penn State administration for perpetuating
problem).
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cusses Spanier, Curley, Schultz, and Paterno’s failure to inquire fur-
ther about the 2001 incident.159  The report further touched upon
their absence of empathy or regard for the child abused during the
incident, as well as the unrestricted and unsupervised access to the
University’s football facilities provided to Sandusky.160  Addition-
ally, the report attributed blame to the Board of Trustees for
neglecting to supervise University officials, as well as exhibiting an
overall lack of awareness of reporting policies.161
Freeh’s counsel provided the Board with one hundred twenty
recommendations and categorized them into eight target areas,
with an overarching goal of enhancing protections for children at
Penn State.162  Among these target areas were “Penn State Culture”,
“Monitoring Change and Measuring Improvement”, “Board of
Trustees Responsibilities and Operations”, and “Programs for Non-
Student Minors and Access to Facilities.”163  Further recommenda-
tions included creating an ethics council, decreasing the indepen-
dent power of University executives, establishing a way to track all
mandated employee training, promoting accessibility and encour-
agement to report concerns, and closely monitoring children par-
ticipating in youth programs on Penn State’s campus.164  One of
the sanctions imposed on Penn State by the NCAA was a require-
159. Id. (criticizing their hands-off approach to reports of Sandusky’s
activity).
160. See id. at 14–15. (“[Spanier, Schultz, Curley and Paterno] exhibited a
striking lack of empathy for Sandusky’s victims by failing to inquire as to their
safety and well-being, especially by not attempting to determine the identity of the
child who Sandusky assaulted in the Lasch Building in 2001.  Further . . . [they]
empowered Sandusky to attract potential victims to the campus and football events
by allowing him to have continued, unrestricted and unsupervised access to the
University’s facilities and affiliation with the University’s prominent football pro-
gram.  Indeed, that continued access provided Sandusky with the very currency
that enabled him to attract his victims.”).
161. See id. at 15 (addressing Spanier, Schultz, Curley and Paterno’s actions,
made capable through being “unchecked by the Board of Trustees that did not
perform its oversight duties . . . .”).
162. See id. at 17–18 (“From the results of interviews . . . and benchmarking
similar practices at other large universities, the Special Investigative Counsel devel-
oped 120 recommendations for consideration by University administrators and the
Board . . . .These steps should assist the University in improving structures, policies
and procedures that are related to the protection of children.”).
163. See Freeh Report, supra note 4, at 17 (listing all eight areas for improve- R
ment, and others of which were Administration and General Counsel Structure,
Policies and Procedures, Compliance Risk and Reporting Misconduct, Athletic De-
partment Integration and Compliance, and University Police Department Over-
sight, Policies and Procedures).
164. See id. at 127–44 (listing all 120 recommendations in one chapter, di-
vided into eight sub-chapters).
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ment to adopt all 120 of the recommendations presented in the
Freeh Report.165
E. Benched and Berated: Responses and Repercussions
from the NCAA
The National Collegiate Athletics Association (“NCAA”),
founded in 1906, is the central agency for college athletics consist-
ing of over 1,200 university-level institutions.166  In addition to the
commonplace issues faced when regulating collegiate athletics,
such as the hosting of events and determination of eligibility stan-
dards, the NCAA has tasked itself with holding the leagues, teams,
and players’ conduct and ethics to high standards.167  Because the
NCAA regulates its member institutions, punishment primarily
arises out of an institution’s violation of or non-compliance with
NCAA promulgated rules.168
The NCAA’s punitive response to the incidents at Penn State
was heavily criticized, with advocates on both sides of the argu-
ment.169  The association’s involvement was heavily debated due in
165. See Brian L. Porto, Can the NCAA Enforcement Process Protect Children from
Abuse in the Wake of the Sandusky Scandal, 22 WIDENER L.J. 555, 576 (2013) (“Indeed,
the first requirement that the corrective component of the NCAA sanctions im-
posts on Penn State is to ‘adopt all recommendations for reform delineated in
Chapter 10 of the Freeh Report.’”).
166. See id. at 558–59 (“The NCAA is a voluntary association comprised of
more than 1,200 public and private four-year colleges and the athletic conferences
to which they belong.”); see also Vincent Nicastro, Deputy Commissioner for the
Big East Conference & Adjunct Professor for Villanova University Charles Widger
School of Law, (Jan. 23, 2019) (presenting on history of NCAA, which was initially
founded in 1906 as Intercollegiate Athletics Association and changed name to
NCAA in 1910).
167. See Porto, supra note 165, at 559 (“[The NCAA’s] stated mission is ‘to R
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by doing so, retain a
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports.’  Accordingly, the NCAA is a regulatory body.  It ‘regulates athletic competi-
tion among its members’ (for example, establishing game rules, eligibility stan-
dards for athletes, lengths of competitive seasons, etc.), ‘conducts championship
events . . . enters into television and promotional contracts relat[ed] to [those] . . .
events, and enters into agreements to license the NCAA name and logos.’”); see
also Nicastro, supra note 166 (presenting on the history of the NCAA, providing its R
“initial purpose of ‘the regulation and supervision of college athletics throughout
the US, in order that athletic activities . . . may be maintained on an ethical place
in keeping with the dignity and high purpose of education’”).
168. See Porto, supra note 165, at 559 (“As part of its regulatory role, the R
NCAA investigates allegations of rules violations, adjudicates disputes arising from
those allegations and penalizes the guilty parties.”).
169. See Hobson, supra note 9 (regarding an executive’s criticism of the way R
Penn State administration handled the scandal, “[w]hile some of . . . the trustees
nodded their heads in agreement, some of the remaining . . . rolled their eyes or
shook their heads in frustration. Some walked out”).
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part to a lack of precedent with similar situations.170  Scrutiny faced
by the NCAA in this case primarily stemmed from the organization
pivoting from its customary practice to circumvent involvement
when allegations of criminal behavior are made against program
members.171  Even when team doctors and student-athletes had
been accused of sexual assault, the NCAA unwaveringly took a
hands-off approach.172  The NCAA’s past avoidance makes its in-
volvement in this case even more surprising.173  While the broader
events implicated members of an NCAA institution’s coaching staff,
Sandusky was not a coach at the time of the McQueary incident and
no athletes were involved in the crimes as either abuser or victim.174
Further, the role of the NCAA in administering sanctions against
teams has historically been confined to violations against the institu-
170. See Doug  Lederman, The  NCAA Crosses a Line, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Nov.
23, 2011), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/11/23/ncaa-inquiry-
penn-state-unprecedented-involvement-criminal-matter [https://perma.cc/35SA-
NT8R] (criticizing NCAA for acting outside the scope of its governance in punish-
ing Penn State when NCAA regulations did not explicitly govern criminal behav-
ior); see also Porto, supra note 165, at 555–57 (“[T]he customary critique morphed R
into a concern that the ad hoc procedure the NCAA used in the Penn State case
would become the Association’s standard enforcement process, or at least its estab-
lished emergency model, in the future.”).
171. See Lederman, supra note 174 (reviewing NCAA handling of Penn State
case).
172. See Cheyna Roth, The NCAA Tells Michigan State No Rules Violated in Larry
Nassar Scandal, NPR (Aug. 30, 2018, 5:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/30/
643465851/the-ncaa-tells-michigan-state-no-rules-violated-in-larry-nassar-scandal
[https://perma.cc/7UMY-7VVU] (reporting on the NCAA’s finding zero viola-
tions against former Michigan State University’s team physician who has been
found guilty of sexually abusing over 150 women); see also Joe Drape and Marc
Tracy, A Majority Agreed She Was Raped by a Stanford Football Player.  That Wasn’t
Enough, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/
sports/football/stanford-football-rape-accusation.html [https://perma.cc/6QUV-
CWP3] (quoting member of NCAA Commission to Combat Campus Sexual Vio-
lence, stating he did not see reason to suspend Stanford football player found to
have committed sexual assault); see also Anya Alvarez, The NCAA Must End Their
Silence on Sexual Violence in College Sports, GUARDIAN (Jun. 15, 2018), https://
www.theguardian.com/sport/2018/jun/15/the-ncaa-must-end-their-silence-on-
sexual-violence-in-college-sports [https://perma.cc/K3EH-2V8F] (disclosing re-
ceipt of full scholarship by NCAA member institution University of Central
Oklahoma to football player who took plea for charge of rape against him).
173. See Roth, supra note 176 (discussing NCAA’s handling of Michigan
State); Drape & Tracy, supra note 176 (reviewing NCAA’s handling of Stanford);
Alvarez, supra note 176 (reporting on NCAA’s handling of Central Oklahoma).
174. See id. at 556 (“[I]t involved no wrongdoing (for example, violation of
NCAA rules) by an athlete, unlike most college sports scandals, which feature ath-
letes accepting improper inducements to attend a particular college or under-the-
table payments after they enroll, or perhaps receiving passing grades for courses in
which they did no work or excessive academic assistance from tutors.”).
26
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol27/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 27  2-MAR-20 12:06
2020] WE ARE GUILTY OF FALLING VICTIM TO A HIERARCHY 127
tion’s own bylaws, rather than in response criminal activity.175
Rather than utilize its normal adjudicative process, the NCAA relied
on the evidence and holdings presented in court to determine the
infractions and penalties appropriate for Penn State.176  The NCAA
reasoned that their own proceedings would not have resulted in a
data compilation as extensive as the Freeh Report.177
Following the NCAA’s response, Penn State and the NCAA en-
tered into a consent decree in July 2012, agreeing that the Freeh
Report presented findings of  NCAA constitution and bylaws viola-
tions.178  While the NCAA cited specific provisions of its founding
documents that were breached, the consent decree more generally
referenced broad expectations of NCAA institutions that were not
met by Penn State under the circumstances.179  Specifically, the
175. See Hobson, supra note 9 (“The NCAA traditionally didn’t venture into R
criminal matters at universities, instead dealing with rules violations within
athletics.”).
176. See Porto, supra note 165, at 574  (“[T]he Supreme Court of the United R
States has held that the NCAA is not a ‘state actor’ for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which means that it is not required to provide due process to institu-
tions and individuals accused of violating its rules.”); see also id. at 559–564 (“If the
NCAA decides to investigate, the president of the subject institution will receive a
‘notice of inquiry’. . . [t]he notice of allegations will notify the accused institution
of the alleged violations of NCAA rules uncovered by the enforcement staff . . . the
institution and accused individuals will have [ninety] days in which to respond . . .
[a]fter the institution responds, the parties attend a prehearing conference to
identify the issues . . . [a]n accused institution may choose not to contest the
charges against it, opting instead for ‘summary disposition’. . . [e]nforcement mat-
ters not resolved by summary disposition proceed to a hearing before the [Com-
mittee on Infractions] . . . during hearings, the COI considers allegations brought
by the enforcement staff, reviews documentary evidence and records of witness
testimony, makes factual findings, and imposes penalties if it concludes that viola-
tions have occurred[.]”).
177. See id. at 569 (“[T]he need for an NCAA investigation was obviated here
by the evidence resulting from the criminal investigation of Sandusky by Penn-
sylvania authorities and from the investigative [Freeh] report . . . which Penn State
had commissioned. The Freeh Report was based on interviews with more than 430
persons . . . and on the analysis of more than 3.5 million pieces of electronic data
and documents. The NCAA would have been hard-pressed to match that degree of
thoroughness and, even if it had, its report likely would have been duplicative of
the Freeh Report.”).
178. See id. at 570 (“Based on the findings of that [Freeh Report], the NCAA
and Penn State signed a consent decree dated July 23, 2012, in which Penn State
(1) acknowledged that facts found by the Freeh Report amounted to violations of
the NCAA’s constitution and bylaws and (2) accepted the consent decree and
waived any right it would otherwise have to an enforcement hearing before the
COI, an appeal . . . or judicial review of the subjects of the consent decree.”).
179. See id. at 573–74 (“[I]n the Penn State case, reflecting the inapplicability
of NCAA bylaws to criminal behaviors . . . the findings reveal violations . . . of
general principles underlying the Association’s governance of college sports.”); see
also id. at 571–72 (“Noting that ‘[t]he NCAA seeks to foster an environment and
culture of honesty,’ the consent decree specifically referenced, as indicative of that
aim, Bylaws 10.01.1 (requiring coaches, athletes, and academic administrators to
27
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consent decree stated that Penn State “fail[ed] to value and uphold
institutional integrity demonstrated by inadequate, and in some in-
stances non-existent, controls and oversight surrounding the athlet-
ics program . . . .”180  The consent decree continued by declaring
that Penn State exhibited “unethical conduct,” lacked maintenance
of “minimal standards of appropriate and responsible conduct,”
and failed to adhere to “fundamental notions of individual
integrity.”181
Relying on the Freeh report, the NCAA accepted the conclu-
sion that Spanier, Schultz and Curley neglected to inform authori-
ties about Sandusky’s misbehavior “‘to avoid the consequences of
bad publicity’ for the University and its cherished football program
by ‘repeatedly conceal[ing] critical facts relating to Sandusky’s
child abuse.’”182  The consent decree also partially attributed the
administration’s oversight of Sandusky’s abuse to the loyalty and ad-
miration exhibited towards Penn State’s football program.183   Con-
sequently, the NCAA issued a variety of sanctions against the
University and football team.184
Penn State feared the NCAA violations would result in the so-
called “death penalty,” which would cancel the next year’s football
season.185   It is speculated that Penn State’s agreement to enter
‘act with honesty and sportsmanship at all times’); 10.1 (providing examples of
errors of omission or commission amounting to ‘unethical conduct’ under NCAA
rules); and 11.1.1. (. . . requiring athletic administrators and coaches to ‘act with
honesty and sportsmanship at all times’) . . . [T]hey violated Bylaw 19.01.2, which
requires employees associated with college athletic programs to model ethical be-
havior in order ‘for intercollegiate athletics to promote the character development
of participants to enhance the integrity of higher education [,] and to promote
civility in society.’”).
180. Id. at 570 (describing penalty rationale as holistic, rather than specific).
181. Id. at 571 (explaining which provisions of NCAA rules were violated).
182. Porto, supra note 165, at 572 (discussing Spanier’s, Schultz’s, and
Curley’s intentional concealment).
183. See id. at 573 (“Also contributing to that failure were . . . [a] ‘culture of
reverence for the football program that [was] ingrained at all levels of the campus
community’ at Penn State.”).
184. See id. at 575 (“Like the process the NCAA followed in the Penn State
case, the penalties it imposed were somewhat unusual, particularly because they
included not only the customary punitive component, but a corrective component
too.”).
185. See Hobson, supra note 9 (“Rumors swirled that the NCAA was consider- R
ing imposing the ‘death penalty,’ the cancellation of an entire football season.”);
see  also Penalties – Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA ENFORCEMENT PROCESS, http://
www.ncaa.org/enforcement/enforcement-process-penalties [https://perma.cc/
W45D-4X9D] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (providing list of circumstances and ele-
ments NCAA considers when determining whether to give death penalty); see also
Eric Dodds, The ‘Death Penalty’ and How the College Sports Conversation Has Changed,
TIME (Feb. 25, 2015), https://time.com/3720498/ncaa-smu-death-penalty/
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into a consent decree, rather than participate in an NCAA investiga-
tion process, was principally decided in order to avoid the death
penalty.186  Although Penn State successfully evaded the death pen-
alty, the football program was unable to escape harsh punish-
ments.187  In addition to a sixty million dollar fine, the NCAA also
banned the football team from participation in any postseason
games for four years, decreased the amount of scholarship money
available for future players, and retracted the football team’s wins
from the first year the administrators were made aware of San-
dusky’s child abuse.188  The reduction in wins was especially im-
pactful for Penn State football fans because it resulted in removing
Coach Paterno’s record as the “winningest” coach of college
football.189
A lawsuit emerged when the NCAA rejected Pennsylvania
lawmakers’ request to spend the sixty million dollars from Penn
State in Pennsylvania.190  This lawsuit generated unfavorable evi-
dence for the NCAA, including communications between NCAA
personnel about imposing punishment on Penn State solely to en-
hance the NCAA’s reputation, rather than punish the school for its
bad acts.191  Additional documentation indicated that NCAA offi-
cials had not only failed to thoroughly review the Freeh Report, but
[https://perma.cc/6K58-JTRN] (detailing events surrounding NCAA’s creation
and first use of “death penalty” against Southern Methodist University for paying
its football players in 1987).
186. See id. (“Do whatever you need to do to keep the NCAA from giving us
the ‘Death Penalty,’ [one] trustee . . . wrote . . . . In response to alumni outrage,
[then University president] Erickson explained that NCAA officials had made
clear Penn State had no choice to avoid the death penalty.  [President of the
NCAA] Emmert indicated that [Penn State’s] only chance to avoid a death penalty
along with sanctions might be to opt for a consent decree . . . . It was a take-it-or-
leave-it proposition.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. See id. (“While Penn State leaders were relieved to avoid the death pen-
alty, some alumni seethed.”).
188. See Porto, supra note 165, at 575–76 (recounting all punishments given R
to Penn State).
189. See Hobson, supra note 9 (“[V]erdict capped an unimaginable downfall R
for Paterno, who just eight months before seemed poised to retire as the win-
ningest, most respected head coach in the history of college football.  In 46 years
as head coach, he had piled up 409 wins and two national championships . . . .”).
190. See id. (discussing spending clash between NCAA and Pennsylvania
lawmakers).
191. See id. (“One staffer, in an email, wrote that NCAA punishments for Penn
State would be unneeded and excessive, but ‘new NCAA leadership is extremely
image conscious, and if they conclude that pursuing allegations against PSU would
enhance the association’s standing with the public, then an infractions case could
follow.’”).
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had not reviewed the report whatsoever.192  Ultimately, the NCAA
settled the case, agreeing to spend Penn State’s fine within the
state, as well as the restoration of the team’s wins.193
III. DRAFTING PLAYS AND MAKING PROJECTIONS: ANALYSIS
A. Call Overturned After Replay Review: Applying Reformed
Pennsylvania Mandated Reporting Laws to the
Sandusky Scandal
To an uninterested third-party, it may seem as if the edits to
the Pennsylvania Child Protective Services statutes, particularly
those made to section 6311, consist of only slightly different ways to
convey the same ideas.194  Analyzing the changes in light of the San-
dusky scandal, however, proves the revisions make an impactful
difference.195
Although the negligent actions of Spanier, Curley, and Schultz
served as the basis for their prosecution, their punishments were
lenient in comparison to the extent of their involvement.196 Previ-
ous versions of Pennsylvania law only designated Spanier, Curley,
and Schultz as “responsible for reporting” during the exchange of
information about the 2001 event, which was not an expansive
enough network to ensure protection.197  Spanier’s, Curley’s, and
Schultz’s positions classified them as “school administrators,” and
therefore, each were reporters within the statute’s scope.198  Mc-
192. See id. (“[NCAA executive committee chair] acknowledged he never ac-
tually read the report because he was vacationing in Hawaii at the time.”).
193. See id. (“In January 2015, the case settled. The NCAA agreed to spend the
money in Pennsylvania and reduced other sanctions, including restoring Paterno’s
win total to 409.”).
194. See § 6311 (2007, 2015) (comparing revisions of applicable statutory lan-
guage throughout different versions).
195. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 225 (concluding that efforts of multiple state R
legislatures to revise mandatory reporter statutes seek to “better protect children”
through “preventing a reoccurrence of a scandal like that involving Sandusky and
Penn State”).
196. See generally Hobson, supra note 9 (“Three former Pennsylvania State R
University administrators, including former president Graham Spanier, were each
sentenced to serve at least two months in jail Friday for failing to alert law enforce-
ment about a 2001 incident involving retired football coach Jerry Sandusky and a
boy in the campus shower.”).  For further discussion of the facts and the aftermath
of the 2001 event, see supra notes 45–56 and accompanying text. R
197. See § 6311(a) (enumerating required reporters, which at time included
school administrators, but not school employees generally).
198. See id. (requiring any school administrator to report suspected instances
of child abuse); see also Commonwealth v. Spanier, 192 A.3d 141, 142 (Pa. Super.
2018) (providing title for Spanier (President), Schultz (Vice President for Finance
and Business), and Curley (Athletic Director)).
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Queary and Paterno, however, were not obligated to report because
school coaches and employees were absent from section 6311’s enu-
merated list.199  Regardless, McQueary and Paterno followed the
chain-of-command reporting policy laid out for required reporters
in the statute.200  The outcome of the events surrounding the Mc-
Queary incident proved Penn State’s hierarchical structure was
clearly insufficient to ensure the safety of children.201
According to past Pennsylvania law, Curley and Schultz ful-
filled what was demanded of them under the statute by bringing
the report of suspected abuse to the university’s premier execu-
tive.202  As the University’s President, Spanier alone was tasked with
expediting the report to CPS for inspection.203   Conversely, had
the current version of section 6311 been effective, McQueary,
Paterno, Curley, Schultz, and Spanier all would have been legally
required to first and foremost report the suspected abuse to CPS.204
Moreover, they each would have been responsible for complying
with the section 6313 standards in their reports to CPS to guarantee
the reported suspicion would be investigated.205  Only after com-
pleting reports with CPS would McQueary, Paterno, Curley, and
Schultz have needed to adhere to the statute’s secondary measure
199. See § 6311(a) (requiring that any school administrator, but not any em-
ployee, coach or student, report suspected instances of child abuse); see also
Spanier, 192 A.3d at 143 (providing roles of Paterno and McQueary).
200. See § 6311(c) (instructing required reporters to inform their superiors of
suspected abuse); see also Spanier, 192 A.3d at 143 (detailing timeline of reporting
from each subordinate to their superior during February 2001).
201. See Spanier, 192 A.3d at 143 (“After speaking with Sandusky and
Raykovitz, Curley informed [Spanier] and Schultz that he had done so. Curley
never contacted [the Department of Welfare], Children and Youth Services, or the
police. Further, Curley did not inform campus police . . . .”).
202. See § 6311(c) (instructing school administrators to inform person in
charge of school of suspected abuse); see also Spanier, 192 A.3d at 143 (describing
Curley and Schultz’s disclosure to Spanier on February 12, 2001 regarding what
McQueary had witnessed three days prior).
203. See § 6311(c) (passing legal responsibility to the person in charge that
the required reporter notified: “Upon notification, the person in charge or the
designated agent, if any, shall assume the responsibility and have the legal obliga-
tion to report or cause a report to be made”).
204. See § 6311(a)–(c) (requiring school employees to report suspected child
abuse immediately to authorities — whether McQueary would have been required
to notify the State is dependent upon whether graduate assistant is considered
school employee or if they retain their student status).
205. See § 6313(a) (mandating that any reporter who makes oral report of
suspected abuse must also follow-up with written report within forty-eight hours of
their original report).
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of protection for the child by notifying their superiors of the sus-
pected abuse.206
Further, the penalties faced by the mandated reporters would
have rightfully been much more excessive if the currently effective
statutes had been in place.207  Today, Paterno, Curley, Schultz, and
Spanier would [each] have been charged with at least one felony of
the third degree for their involvement in ignoring Sandusky’s be-
havior.208  Additionally, if the state could prove the reporters had
reason to believe Sandusky was still abusing children, it could have
charged the mandatory reporters with multiple third-degree felo-
nies under the “continuing course of action” section of the stat-
ute.209  Lastly, the Pennsylvania Legislature’s implication of the
statute of limitations is detrimental to cases given that many in-
stances of child abuse are not reported within two years.210
B. Left in the Dust: Absence of Justice for Sandusky’s
Subsequent Abuse Victims
While the changes to Pennsylvania’s mandated reporting laws
are a step in the right direction to protect children from abuse,
more still can, and should, be done to punish those whose igno-
rance left children in a vulnerable state.211  Although these revi-
sions would have held Spanier, Graham, Curley, and Paterno more
accountable for the victim involved in the McQueary incident, the
four victims who were abused by Sandusky subsequent to that inci-
dent may not have been abused if Sandusky was immediately re-
ported in 2001.212
206. See § 6311(a)–(c) (requiring school employees to report suspected child
abuse immediately to authorities, and thereafter notify person in charge of
school).
207. See § 6319 (comparing current and previous versions).
208. See id. (contrasting current and previous versions of statute).
209. See id. (discussing § 6319’s updated penalties).
210. See Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape, PCAR urges legislators to remove
the statute of limitations for child sexual assault cases, PA COALITION AGAINST RAPE
(Aug. 14, 2018), http://www.pcar.org/news/pcar-urges-legislators-remove-statute-
limitations-child-sexual-assault-cases [https://perma.cc/UCG8-M3CA] (discussing
strong efforts towards eliminating statute of limitations for sexual assault of minors
because “[t]he experience of sexual assault often causes victims to feel confused,
scared, embarrassed, shamed and humiliated.  When people who perpetrate abuse
also manipulate the naivete of youth, these feelings are exacerbated.  This is why it
is normal for survivors of sexual assault to wait years and decades before telling
anyone what was done to them”).
211. See §§ 6311–19 (comparing previous version of statute to current
version).
212. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3123 (2003) (defining involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse with minor as first-degree felony); see also 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
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Currently, the mandated reporting laws have expanded penal-
ties imposed on mandated reporters to address instances in which a
child’s offender continues to abuse the child.213  This portion of
the law provides liability for additional charges when “a person’s
willful failure . . . continues while the person knows or has reason to
believe the child is actively being subjected to abuse . . . .”214  The
present provision limits the liability of the reporter in two ways: (1)
when a reporter “knows or has reasonable cause to believe,” and (2)
the abuse is being committed against “a child the reporter was
aware of.”215
In order to protect future potential victims, the Pennsylvania
legislature should expand this provision to safeguard a broader au-
dience.216  First, lawmakers should elaborate on what constitutes a
“reasonable cause to believe.”217  In doing so, a per se rule should
be implemented to mandate a reporter who is aware of a child
abuse occurrence, but has not reported that person, or knows that
person has not faced investigation or prosecution by law enforce-
ment, should assume the abuse is continuing.218  Under the current
law, this loophole works in favor of ignorance by the reporter, who
will have the ability to avert responsibility by claiming they had no
“reasonable cause to believe” the abuse continued to happen after
§ 106(b)(2) (1997) (“A crime is a felony of the first degree . . . a person convicted
thereof may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which is
more than ten years.”);  Commonwealth v. Spanier, 192 A.3d 141, 142 (Pa. Super.
2018) (“After speaking with Sandusky and Raykovitz, Curley informed [Spanier]
and Schultz that he had done so. Curley never contacted DPW, Children and
Youth Services, or the police . . . McQueary continued to observe Sandusky in the
Lasch Building after hours. Sandusky subsequently abused at least four more
young boys, including one in the Lasch Building shower in the summer of 2002.”)
(detailing timeline of Penn State officials discussing 2001 incident with one an-
other without bringing issue to authorities, followed by Sandusky’s continuation of
abusive behavior).
213. See § 6319 (discussing penalties for failing to report child abuse).
214. Id. (explaining statute’s imposition of liability for person exhibiting will-
ful ignorance of child abuse).
215. Id. (providing criterion that must be met to be held liable for inaction as
mandated reporter).
216. See Peter Garsden, Mandatory Reporting – The Legal Case for Change, 2 IALS
L. REV. 29, 32–35 (2014) (discussing enhanced sentences for repeat offenders, but
not repeat ignorers).
217. See § 6319(b) (“If a person’s willful failure under subsection (a) contin-
ues while the person knows or has reasonable cause to believe the child is actively
being subjected to child abuse . . . .”) (emphasis added)).
218. See Zachary Myers, Enhanced Sentences for Repeat Sexual Offenders Against
Children, 63 U.S. ATT’YS. BULL 65, 65 (2015) (“Furthermore, many offenders who
are identified and prosecuted have been previously accused or convicted of sexual
offenses involving minors.”).
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the first event.219  It is in the best interest of public policy for any
suspicion whatsoever to be looked into by a reporter, rather than to
encourage those reporters to protect themselves by avoiding in-
volvement in the situation.220
It is not uncommon for criminal offenders to have multiple
victims and Pennsylvania needs to revise its mandated reporting
statute to reflect this and expand its protection of children.221  Spe-
cifically, Pennsylvania needs to address that, when a mandated re-
porter has reasonable belief that an adult is abusing a child, the
reporter must assume that child is not the offender’s only victim.222
The implications of such a statutory requirement provide due pro-
cess that should be guaranteed to the abused.223  Under this re-
vised, strict interpretation, victims whose abuse occurs subsequent
to the incident causing the mandated reporter’s reasonable belief
will be able to seek justice for the reporter’s silence, rather than
solely limiting such reconciliation to the victim involved in the inci-
dent.224  The need for this type of rigorous standard was made ap-
parent in the Sandusky case, given that each of Sandusky’s victims
following the McQueary event could not bring action against the
reporters who could have protected them.225
C. Changes to League Policy: A Call for the Adoption of
Federal Mandated Reporting Laws
The absence of federal legislation standardizing mandatory re-
porting laws on a national level contributes to gaps in reporting.226
Just as various sports leagues leave punishment decisions for certain
219. See Garsden, supra note 216, at 32 (“The law is written so that someone R
may report with suspicion only, not certainty but it appears that many do not be-
cause of a fear that they might be wrong.”).
220. See id. (noting mandated reporters who are suspicious avoid further
investigation).
221. See Myers, supra note 218, at 65 (“Furthermore, many offenders who are R
identified and prosecuted have been previously accused or convicted of sexual of-
fenses involving minors.”).
222. See id. at 65–67 (discussing enhanced sentences for repeat offenders, but
not repeat ignorers).
223. See Garsden, supra note 216, at 32–35 (reviewing due process concerns). R
224. See id. (discussing mandated reporters).
225. For a comprehensive discussion of Pennsylvania’s mandated reporting
statutes and its relation to the Penn State Scandal, see supra notes 140–154 and R
accompanying text.
226. See Leonard G. Brown III & Kevin Gallagher, Mandatory Reporting of
Abuse: A Historical Perspective on the Evolution of States’ Current Mandatory Reporting
Laws with a Review of the Laws in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, U. VILL. L. REV.
TOLLE LEGE 37, 38 (2013) (noting differences between strict versus lenient nature
of state statutes).
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types of misbehavior to the discretion of each team, federal law puts
each state in charge of drafting, effecting, implementing, and over-
seeing their own mandatory reporting laws.227  Currently, the only
federal regulation addressing governing mandated reporting is the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”).228  Rather
than resolve discrepancies between the states’ mandatory reporting
laws, CAPTA simply conditions a state’s receipt of federal funding
on its passage of legislation governing mandatory reporting.229
Ever since the extent to which child abuse goes unreported
and unprosecuted has gained public attention, there have been
calls for consistency in mandated reporting laws through the enact-
ment of a federal statute.230  However, each attempt to adopt such a
law has been unsuccessful.231  The implementation of a federal law
governing mandatory reporting would not only eliminate confu-
sion, but, more importantly, would set a minimum standard for
each state.232  Setting this bar would be vital given that some states
only provide basic regulations for child protection through report-
ing, and such low requirements are adverse to safeguarding
minors.233
D. More Than Just Jerseys: Uniform Mandated Reporters
Because of a lack of uniformity throughout the states, reports
of suspected child abuse are often times missed because it is un-
227. See id. at 42 (“As Justice Louis D. Brandeis opined, one of the benefits of
federalism is that states can act as laboratories of experimentation. Left to their
own devices, states can craft different solutions to the same problem and imple-
ment them in order to achieve the best possible system.”).
228. See id. at 37–38 (“The federal government’s first major foray into the
area of child abuse prevention occurred on January 31, 1974, when Congress en-
acted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA).”).
229. See id. at 38 (“CAPTA has no federal mandatory reporting provision, but
rather requires states to pass their own mandatory reporting provisions in order to
receive federal grants.”).
230. See id. at 45 (“Justice Department findings that [ninety] percent of all
child abuse cases do not go forward to prosecution.” (citing The Treatment of Child
Abuse Allegations and Victims in the Judicial and Victims Services System: Hearing Before
the Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2 (1989)) (referring to statement of Sena-
tor Harry Reid)).
231. See id. at 46 (“[T]he 101st Congress decided ultimately not to adopt a
federal mandatory reporting provision and continue to abdicate the issue to the
states.”).
232. See Brown  & Gallagher, supra note 226, at 44 (“CAPTA does not have a R
federal uniform provision about mandatory reporting because the drafters of
CAPTA decided that it was not purposed to create a federal strategy to deal with
child abuse in its totality.”).
233. See id. at 38 (“[T]he least comprehensive statutes require on a small list
of named professional groups to report.”).
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known who possesses legal responsibility for the reports.234  Follow-
ing the Sandusky scandal at Penn State, Pennsylvania reformed its
statute to include a greater number of categories of adults responsi-
ble for reporting suspected abuse.235  Pennsylvania was not the only
state to respond this way, as bills in many other states were initiated
soon thereafter.236  Because each state is responsible for adoption
and implementation of their own mandated reporting laws, there is
no ultimate authority advising the states regarding which categories
of adults must be considered mandated reporters.237  While some
states are extremely broad in their inclusivity, others narrowly tailor
their legislation.238
Although efforts to institute federal legislation regulating man-
dated reporting have fallen short, defining the persons legally re-
quired to report is only one part of a multi-faceted regulatory
issue.239  Providing uniform characterization of groups of adults re-
sponsible for reporting suspected child abuse would not only be
helpful, but should be necessary.240  Furthermore, all adults should
be designated as mandatory reporters.241  Multiple inconsistent and
conflicting versions of the statute lead to confusing responsibilities
234. See id. at 55 (“[Senator Bob Casey] proposed the legislation to close a
loophole that allows abusers to get away with heinous crimes and emphasize the
responsibility of all adults to protect children from abuse and neglect.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
235. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s mandated reporting laws, see
supra notes 116–154 and accompanying text. R
236. See Brown & Gallagher, supra note 226, at 50–51 (“Although the scandal R
erupted in Pennsylvania, the fury over Sandusky’s high-profile abuse has spread
beyond the borders of the Commonwealth, affecting change across the nation.”);
see also Kelly, supra note 8, at 215 (“As of June 2012, approximately 105 bills had R
been introduced in 30 states and the District of Columbia. Since then, many states
have continued to introduce and amend several bills, and Florida Kentucky, Loui-
siana, the District of Columbia, Montana, and New York have enacted laws to pre-
vent similar instances of child abuse.”) (remarking on national effect Penn State
Scandal has had on child abuse statutes.).
237. See Brown & Gallagher, supra note 226, at 38 (“States’ laws vary in their R
comprehensiveness with respect to mandatory reporting of abuse.”).
238. See id. at 38 (“The most comprehensive statutes require all persons who
have reasonable cause to suspect abuse to report, while the least comprehensive
statutes require only a small list of named professional groups to report.”); see also
Kelly, supra note 8, at 218 (providing Nebraska’s proposed strict reporting require- R
ments, noting Florida’s enhancement of failure to report to third-degree felony,
and examining variety of other states’ reactive legislation changes).
239. See §§ 6311–19 (noting that § 6311 is only one part of statute).
240. See Brown & Gallagher, supra note 226, at 47 (calling for action that R
would abolish excuse of uncertainty about whether person was mandated reporter
or had duty to report).
241. See e.g., id. at 51 (“[Missouri] called for a law requiring ‘any person who
witnesses sexual abuse of a child to report it to law enforcement.’. . . Missouri was
not alone in its desire to change . . . .”).
36
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol27/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 37  2-MAR-20 12:06
2020] WE ARE GUILTY OF FALLING VICTIM TO A HIERARCHY 137
of a person based on their occupational position at the time of the
suspicion, which state that person lives if different from the state in
which they encountered the suspicion, as well as other shifting de-
pendencies.242  Opponents of the cumulative reporter definition
defend their position by alleging such institution would result in a
flood of unnecessary reports, ineffective allocation of time, and ex-
pensive costs to the departments responsible for these investiga-
tions.243  However, there is no evidence to support this conclusion
because this has never been launched on a federal level.244
IV. CONCLUSION
Ensuring the protection of children is an undisputed govern-
mental interest.245  Adults tasked with providing this protection are
implicated through state mandated reporting laws.246  However, the
language and governance of these laws are not always adequate.247
The weak nature of Pennsylvania’s mandatory reporting laws be-
came apparent through the ignorance of high-level administrators
at Penn State toward Sandusky’s repeated sexual abuse of minor
boys.248  Although Pennsylvania laws have evolved since the inci-
dent, many victims were left to endure abuse as a result of prior
deficiencies in legislation.249
The lack of uniformity in definitions and regulations of man-
dated reporting of child abuse, coupled with institutions’ concerns
242. See id. at 55 (reviewing Senator Casey’s proposed legislation).
243. See id. (“[This proposal] mobilized opponents of universal mandated re-
porting . . . writ[ing] that more mandated reporting will overload child protective
service agencies, force people to call in cases that are ‘patently absurd’ because
they fear penalties, and subject more children to the trauma of child abuse investi-
gations, which usually include a ‘visual inspection.’” (quoting Richard Wexler, In-
creasing Mandatory Reporting of Alleged Child Abuse and Neglect Will Hurt Children, NAT’
COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM (Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.nccpr.org/reports/
mandatoryreporting)).
244. See id. at 56 (stating it is unclear whether more comprehensive man-
dated reporting would help).
245. For a further discussion of endangering the welfare of a child statutes,
see supra notes 73–115 and accompanying text. R
246. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s mandated reporting statutes,
see supra notes 116–154 and accompanying text. R
247. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s mandated reporting statutes
and its relation to the Penn State Scandal, see supra notes 36–154 and accompany- R
ing text.
248. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s mandated reporting statutes
and its relation to the Penn State Scandal, see supra notes 36–154 and accompany- R
ing text.
249. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s mandated reporting statutes
and its relation to the Penn State Scandal, see supra notes 36–154 and accompany- R
ing text.
37
Fitzgerald: We Are Guilty Of Falling Victim To A Hierarchy Reporting System:
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 38  2-MAR-20 12:06
138 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27: p. 101
for their image, places children at risk for legal ignorance by adults
who are aware of their abuse.250  In order to remedy this situation,
the fastest and most expansive reformation option to implement is
to require all adults to act as mandatory reporters.251  Penn State
was not prepared to provide adequate protection of minors who
were not on their campus as students.252  Because of this, adults in
charge at the school felt that protecting these children was not
their legal responsibility and—because of the governing laws at the
time of the incidents—they were right to some extent.253  Their
level of culpability would have been much greater had the current
Pennsylvania laws been in place at the time.254 This situation is only
one example of why instituting stricter and broader mandated re-
porting laws are vital for our country’s youth.255  Action must be
taken to ensure abuse does not continue to happen.256
Caroline Fitzgerald*
250. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s mandated reporting statutes
and its relation to the Penn State Scandal, see supra notes 36–154 and accompany- R
ing text.
251. For a further discussion of suggestion regarding uniform definition of a
mandated reporter, see supra notes 234–244 and accompanying text. R
252. For a further discussion of these shortcomings noted in the Freeh Re-
port, see infra notes 155–165 and accompanying text. R
253. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s mandated reporting statutes
and its relation to the Penn State Scandal, see supra notes 36–154 and accompany- R
ing text.
254. For a further discussion of the culpability of mandated reporters, see
supra notes 127–149 and accompanying text.
255. For a further discussion of suggested revisions to Pennsylvania, and
adoption of federal, mandated reporting laws, see supra notes 211–244 and accom- R
panying text.
256. For a further discussion of suggested revisions to Pennsylvania, and
adoption of federal, mandated reporting laws, see supra notes 211–244 and accom- R
panying text.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A. in Public Policy, University of Delaware, 2014.  To my family—I cannot
thank you enough for the relentless support and enthusiasm you have always
shown me.  To Greg, Cat, Alex, Jess, and Pat—thank you for all of the hard work
you put into the Journal, and especially for your efforts in sharpening this article.
Finally, to Aaron Fisher and all of the other boys who were subject to the
abuse central to this article—thank you.  Your strength and courage to come for-
ward did far more than stop one perpetrator—it ignited national efforts of public
awareness and legal reform aimed at protecting children in hopes that one day
experiences like yours will never happen again.  Thank you.
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